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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. AND 
DETERMINATIVE LAWS OR STATUTES 
Plaintiff does not dispute the allegations contained in the Jurisdictional 
Statement, Statement of the Issues, or Statement of Determinative Laws or Statutes as 
set forth in Defendant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff disputes the characterizations contained in Defendant's Statement of the 
Case under the heading of the "Nature of the Case" as containing irrelevant and 
immaterial allegations. The Statement of the Case, to be accurate, should be as follows: 
(1) The Defendant executed a promissory note dated December 20, 
1986 in favor of Plaintiff. 
(2) The note was a standard form promissory note which was clear and 
unambiguous as to the parties and its terms. 
(3) Defendant did not pay the note according to its terms. 
(4) The promissory note did not reference a "diesel tractor truck", or 
other security collateral or happening of a future event or a contingency. 
Defendant alleged that the sale of the truck was the basis for the promissory 
note. 
(5) The Plaintiff filed an action to collect amounts owing under the 
promissory note. 
1 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Plaintiff disputes the following referenced facts contained in Defendant's Brief 
under the heading "Relevant Facts" (page 3), to wit: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5. These 
statements are irrelevant, unnecessary, and concern a matter not at issue in the present 
lawsuit and/or are barred by the Parole Evidence Rule. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It was proper as a matter of law for the Trial Court to render summary judgment 
under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
Assuming, for argument purposes only, that there were representations by the 
Plaintiff to the Defendant, the decision of the Trial Court granting Plaintiff summary 
judgment was proper as a matter of law. 
The Defendant has waived or is estopped from asserting fraud as an affirmative 
defense. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
RENDER SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER THE 
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
The promissory note, which is the subject of Plaintiffs Complaint, a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", is a standard form promissory note obUgating the 
Defendant to pay to Plaintiff a sum certain upon the terms stated in the note. The 
promissory note is indisputably clear and unambiguous on its face, and this was a finding 
2 
of fact made by the Trial Court (Determination of Fact entered by the Trial Court, page 
3, para. 8, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B") and an issue not in dispute 
by the parties on appeal. The note does not contain a reference to the sale of a truck 
or contain any representation regarding the alleged "road worthiness" of the truck. In 
fact, the promissory note makes no reference to any collateral, security, representation, 
contingency, or future events as a condition of payment. 
The Parole Evidence Rule provides that if the contract is in writing and the 
language is not ambiguous, the intention of the party must be determined from the 
words of the agreement. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); Atlas 
Corp. v. Clovis Nafl Bank, 737 P.2d 225,229 (Utah 1987); Oberhanslvv.Earle, 572 P.2d 
1384, 1386 (Utah 1977). 
A court may only consider extrinsic evidence after careful consideration of the 
contract language to determine if it is ambiguous or uncertain. Winegar, Supra.; 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292,1983 (Utah 1983). 
A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies". Winegar, Supra.: Mann v. Wetter, 785 P.2d 1064,1067 (Ore.App. 1990). 
Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law. See Faulkner, Supra, at 
1293. 
In this case, the promissory note between the parties is clear and ambiguous. 
Accordingly, it was proper for the Court to not allow parole evidence and render 
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summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant for the balance of the 
promissory note. 
POINT II 
FOR ARGUMENT ONLY, THE DECISION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WAS PROPER AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Defendant's argument that the parole evidence should be allowed is 
without merit. 
Summary judgment was granted by the Trial Court based upon a finding that the 
promissory note was in fact clear and unambiguous on its face and that it "did not refer 
to any collateral or security or the happening of any future event11. (Exh. "B", para. 8). 
Defendant argues that the case of Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 
1985) is controlling and that pursuant to the ruling of Union Bank it was improper for 
the Trial Court to have rendered summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. 
In Union Bank, the Appellant (Swenson) executed a promissory note in favor of 
Appellee (Union Bank). The Appellant, Ronald Swenson, signed the note as president 
of State Lumber, Inc. and Mr. and Mrs. Swenson also executed the note "individually 
and personally". Subsequently, there was a default on the note and Union Bank sued 
State Lumber and the Swensons personally to recover on the promissory note. Union 
Bank moved for summary judgment against the Swensons. The Swensons, in their 
amended answer, set forth the affirmative defense that they had not intended to 
personally guarantee the subject promissory note. The Swensons allege that Union Bank 
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representatives had assured them that their signatures was for appearances only and that 
there would be no effort to collect them personally. (Union at 664). 
In Union Bank, the Swensons filed affidavits which alleged that the bank 
representative indicated that the purpose for the instrument being personally executed 
was "to satisfy bank auditors and the loan committee rather than create personal 
liability". (Union at 666). As such, the issue in Union Bank was whether or not the 
Swensons were to be held personally liable on the default of the promissory note. 
The facts of this case can be distinguished from the facts of Union Bank. In 
Union Bank, the issue was whether or not the Swensons intended to be personally liable 
under the note which was an issue of fact. In this case, there is no issue whether 
Defendant signed the note, whether Defendant intended to be personally bound by the 
note, or whether there were any representations by Plaintiff to the effect that Plaintiff 
would not institute collection of the note against the Defendant if there was a default 
of the note. In this case, Defendant signed the note intending to be personally bound 
by it. (See Exhibit "A"). There were no issues of fact, and as such, the summary 
judgment entered against Defendant by the Trial Court was proper. 
B. Defendant claims that the Trial Court gave "no consideration" to the 
issue of fraud in Defendant's Affidavit and his Amended Answer filed with the Trial 
Court. (See Defendant's Brief, page 5). 
The Defendant raised the issue of fraud throughout the proceedings in the Trial 
Court. Defendant asserted a counterclaim against Plaintiff based upon fraud. (See 
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Trial Court Record, pages 16-18). With regard to Defendant's Counterclaim, the Trial 
Court held: 
The Defendant's Counterclaim is barred by the statute of 
limitations and should be dismissed. 
Plaintiff plead fraud as an affirmative defense in his amended answer. (See Defendant's 
Answer and Counterclaim (Third Defense, Trial Record pages 14 and 15). 
The Defendant orally argued the issue of fraud as a counterclaim and an 
affirmative defense at the time Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by 
the Trial Court. (See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed by Defendant, Trial Record pages 129-133). The issue of fraud was raised and 
determined by the Trial Court to be without merit under the circumstances. 
Defendant's allegation that the Court gave no consideration to Defendant's fraud claim 
is without merit. 
POINT HI 
THE DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED OR IS 
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING FRAUD AS 
AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. 
Assuming, for argument purposes only, that there were representations made by 
the Plaintiff regarding a diesel truck, it is well established that an agreement obtained 
by misrepresentation, fraud, or mistake is generally voidable. Tanner v. District Judges 
of the Third Judicial District Court. 649 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah 1982); Sugarhouse Finance Co. 
v. Anderson. 610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980); 17 AmJur.2d, Contracts §143, et seq. 
(1964). 
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Where a party has entered into a contract where fraud may have been involved 
and after having knowledge of the fact that fraud may have been involved, the party 
continues to perform or otherwise ratifies the contract, that party is deemed to have 
waived the claim of fraud- Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901 
(Utah 1976). It has also been held that the person who claims to be defrauded must 
exercise reasonable prudence and diligence in discovering the fraud and seek a remedy 
therefor or is precluded from doing so. Bezner at 901. 
In the present case, the subject promissory note was executed on or about 
December 20, 1986. (See Determination of Fact and Basis for Granting Summary 
Judgment entered by the Trial Court, paragraph 1, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit lfC,f). The Defendant made periodic payments to the Plaintiff pursuant to the 
aforesaid promissory note between January 1, 1987 and July 5, 1989, a period of 
approximately two and one-half (2-1/2 years). (See Determination of Fact and Basis for 
Granting Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, para. 2 and 5; page 3 of Defendant's Brief). 
A person, with full knowledge of the facts, and at a time when he is fully 
competent and capable to contract for himself accept the benefit accruing under a void 
contract, adopts a contract, then that person is estopped to deny the validity of the 
contract. Burke Aviation Corp. v. Alton Jennings Co., 377 P.2d 578 (Okl. 1963). 
In the present case, the Defendant had knowledge of the facts which he now 
claims, constitute a material misrepresentation "shortly after taking possession of the 
truck". (See Defendant's Brief, Statement of Relevant Facts, paragraph 6, page 4). 
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Notwithstanding Defendant's knowledge of an alleged fraud, Defendant took no action 
concerning the alleged fraud until he filed his Answer and Counterclaim in October 
1991. (Amended Answer and Counterclaim, Trial Record pages 13-18). Defendant 
waited approximately five (5) years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud 
before it took any action or sought a remedy based upon the alleged fraud. Yet during 
this time, he used the truck and ultimately sold the subject truck. (See Defendant's 
Brief, page 4, para. 8). The Defendant waived his right to assert fraud as an affirmative 
defense and/or is estopped from denying the enforceability of the note based upon fraud 
as a matter of law. 
Finally, it is pertinent to note, that Defendant alleges at paragraph 10 of his 
Affidavit filed in opposition to the Summary Judgment (Exhibit "Cf to Defendant's brief) 
that he sold the truck and paid: 
[t]he entire sales price of $3,500.00 to Mr. Hanson. It was 
my belief that I had paid more than the vehicle was worth 
and that I had satisfied my obligation to Mr. Hansen. 
In the Statement of Relevant Facts of Defendant's brief, he states at paragraph 
8, page 4: 
Parker eventually sold the truck for $3,500.00 and paid that 
amount over to Hansen. (Affidavit of Parker 11 11). 
There is, however, no proof that the Defendant communicated his ffbelief' in any way 
Plaintiff. 
The record of payment of the Defendant to Plaintiff as set forth in paragraph 5 
of Defendant's Statement of Relevant Facts (Defendant's Brief, pages 3-4) demonstrates 
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that the Defendant did not pay the amount of $3,500.00 to Plaintiff when he sold the 
truck. Defendant's last three payments to Plaintiff were: 
November 19, 1988 $1,500.00 
March 14, 1989 $1,500.00 
July 15, 1989 $1,000.00 
The Defendant's own Statement of Relevant Facts demonstrates that Defendant did not 
pay $3,500.00 to Plaintiff. The appeal filed by the Plaintiff is merely a device by which 
Defendant is attempting to avoid his obligations under the promissory note. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant executed and delivered to Plaintiff a promissory note on or about 
December 20,1986. According to the terms of the promissory note, Defendant was to 
make certain payments to the Plaintiff. At the time Defendant executed the note, 
Defendant was over the age of majority and under no legal disability. The subject 
promissory note was clear and unambiguous on its face and did not refer to any 
collateral or security or the happening of any future event. The Defendant failed to pay 
the note according to its terms. Accordingly, it was appropriate for the Trial Court to 
enter summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and said summary judgment should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
Defendant claims that by simply raising the issue of fraud in its Counterclaim that 
summary judgment should be precluded. For the reasons stated above, the case 
authority upon which the Defendant relies is without merit in this case and the judgment 
by the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
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Finally, if a contract is procured by fraud it may be voidable. It is, however, up 
to the party who claims to be defrauded to exercise reasonable prudence and diligence 
in discovering the fraud and then seek a remedy therefore or that party is precluded 
from doing so as a matter of Utah law. In the present case, the Defendant, by its own 
admission, discovered the facts upon which it bases its allegations of fraud in January 
1987. Defendant, however, failed to take any action to enforce its rights or remedies 
regarding the contract until Plaintiff brought an action to enforce the terms of the 
promissory note in 1991. Defendant waived the right and/or is estopped from now 
asserting the affirmative defense of fraud as a matter of law and the judgment of the 
Trial Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this ££^*~ day of August, 1993. s~r 
ROBERT W.HDOHES ^ \ 
Attorney for Plan/tiffTRespondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Brief to 
Frederick N. Green and Julie V. Lund, GREEN & BERRY, 10 Exchange Place, 622 
Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this Z-& ~~ day of 
August, 1993. 
hansparLbrf 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
/ <%~7Dt> «? sJ'JC • tfk 
f r FOR VALUE RECEIVED I PROMISE TO PAY TO THE ORDER.OF 
with sin-per cent interest. 
The entire unpaid balance of the above named principal sum and interest to become due and payable immediately 
without notice or demand, in event of my failure to make any payments as above agreed. 
And it is also agreed that in case of default of payment, and this note is placed in the hands of a collector or an attorney 
for collection, all collection fees, attorney fees, costs, and all other expenses, will be paid by the undersigned. All parties 
hereon, whether maker or endorser, each for himself, waives notice of dishonor, demand, and protest, and consents to any 
extension of time the holder may rrant. All exemptions are w aived. 
Address. 
EXHIBIT "B" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
N. H. HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE PARKER, 
Defendant. 
DETERMINATIONS OF FACT AND 
BASIS FOR GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 91090§l f f t D ! S T R I S T C O U a T 
Tnird Judicial District 
FEB 9 2 m 
/5/ SALT LAKE COUNTY 
This action came on for hearing pursuant to plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment before the Court, the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson presiding. The plaintiff was represented by 
his counsel of record, Robert W. Hughes, and the defendant was 
represented by his attorney, Julie Lund, of the law firm of 
Green & Berry. The parties having made argument to the Court, 
and the Court having reviewed the pleadings and the file of 
this matter and being fully advised of the issues before the 
Court, enters it Determinations of Fact and Basis for Granting 
Summary Judgment. 
FACTS 
1. On or about the 20th day of December, 1986, defendant 
executed and delivered to the plaintiff a Promissory Note (the 
HANSEN V. PARKER PAGE TWO DETERMINATIONS OF FACT 
"Note"), which provided that the defendant, for value received, 
promised to pay to the plaintiff, the amount of $12,700.00. 
The Note provided that it would be paid at the rate of 
$1,000.00 per month, beginning January 1, 1987, until the 
principal and accrued interest were paid in full. 
2. The defendant made payments to the plaintiff as 
follows: 
January 1, 1987 $1,000.00 
March 10, 1987 1,000.00 
April 13, 1987 252.00 
May 1, 1987 1,000.00 
July 21, 1987 240.00 
May 1, 1988 1,000.00 
November 18, 1988 1,500.00 
March 14, 1989 1,500.00 
July 15, 1989 1,000.00 
3. There remains a balance owing by the defendant to the 
plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the Note of $8,844.88 as of 
August 21, 992, plus interest after that date. 
4. The Note provided that if it was placed in the hands 
of a collector or an attorney for collection, then all 
collection fees, attorney's fees, costs, and all other expenses 
would be paid by the defendant. 
5. The Note was placed with an attorney for collection. 
HANSEN V. PARKER PAGE THREE DETERMINATIONS OF FACT 
6. The defendant's Counterclaim against the plaintiff is 
barred by th* statute of limitations and defendant's counsel 
stipulated to the dismissal of defendant's Counterclaim at the 
hearing on this matter. 
GROUNDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
7. At the time the defendant executed the Note, the 
defendant was over the age of majority and under no legal 
disability. 
8. The Note was clear and unambiguous on its face, did 
not refer to any collateral or security, or the happening of 
any future event. 
9. The defendant failed to pay the Note according to its 
terms. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Summary Judgment as a 
matter of law against defendant. 
2. A Judgment in this matter in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendant should be entered consistent with the 
foregoing Determinations of Fact. 
3. The defendant's Counterclaim is barred by the statute 
of limitations and should be dismissed. 
HANSEN V. PARKER PAGE FOUR DETERMINATIONS OF FACT 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to his attorney's fees and costs 
in this matter. 
Dated this ^^^day of February, 1993. 
/2L 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
HANSEN V. PARKER PAGE FIVE DETERMINATIONS OF FACT 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Determinations of Fact and Basis for 
Granting Summary Judgment, to the following, this f__day 
of February, 1993: 
Robert W. Hughes 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
7050 S. Union Park Avenue, Suite 420 
P.O. Box 57005 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-005 
Frederick N. Green 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 528 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
